In my book, Praxeological Ethics, I discussed my proposition that ethics is neither objective or subjective, but a combination of both. However, I didn’t spend much space elaborating on my views, as that probably would have taken an entire chapter to do. Instead, I’ll use this article to elaborate more on this apparently paradoxical position and why it makes more sense than you might think.
Ethics has a lot of distinctions and bifurcations. You are either a realist or non-realist, cognitivist or non-cognitivist, etc. There are a few theories that try to have a foot in both camps, but most philosophers divide themselves along these lines into various camps of thought. Objectivism and subjectivism are one of these lines. Objectivists believe that ethical statements that are true are true regardless of the feelings or dispositions of any observers. Just as the couch in my living room continues to exist whether I am thinking about it or not, so too do ethical properties exist regardless of how we feel about them. Subjectivists beg to differ, believing that ethical statements are true at least in part due to the feelings or dispositions of observers. Just like my opinion on a movie is subjective to my own tastes and preferences, so too are ethical properties dependent on how my states of mind.
A priori, there doesn’t seem to be any room for compromise between these two positions. However, we can bridge this chasm through an understanding of the Praxeological nature of action. As I discuss in Chapter 1 of Praxeological Ethics, all ethical statements can be broken down into Praxeological components. Every ethical statement is an evaluation of the suitability for a means to attain an end. Consequently, any discussion of the objectivity or subjectivity of ethics is reducible to a discussion of the objectivity or subjectivity of action itself. With this in mind, is action objective or subjective?
This is a difficult question. On one hand, action expresses clearly subjective qualities. I act in a particular way because I will myself to act in that way. If I felt differently, then I would act differently. There isn’t any sense in which my actions are independent or neutral with regard to my mental states. Even so, action exhibits objective qualities as well. The actions that I take effectuate changes in the outside world. Action only ever takes place, according to Mises, in order to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. That state of affairs exists in reality, independent of me. If it didn’t then I either wouldn’t need to act or wouldn’t feel the need to!
So which is it? Is action objective or subjective? From a Praxeological perspective, it appears to contain qualities of both. But how is this possible? How can something be objective in one sense, but subjective in another? For assistance in unraveling this paradox, I propose we turn to Economic Science and the Austrian Method by Hans Hermann-Hoppe. In the following quote, Hoppe is examining the classic mind-body problem of philosophy, but his conclusions speak directly to the issue of objectivity/subjectivity in action:
“Consider, for example, this programmatic statement of his: ‘So far it has been assumed that our knowledge had to conform to observational reality’; instead it should be assumed ‘that observational reality conform to our knowledge.’
Mises provides the solution to this challenge. It is true, as Kant says, that true synthetic a priori propositions are grounded in self-evident axioms and that these axioms have to be understood by reflection upon ourselves rather than being in any meaningful sense ‘observable’. Yet we have to go one step further. We must recognize that such necessary truths are not simply categories of our mind, but that our mind is one of acting persons. Our mental categories have to be understood as ultimately grounded in categories of action. And as soon as this is recognized, all idealistic suggestions immediately disappear. Instead, an epistemology claiming the existence of true synthetic a priori propositions becomes a realistic epistemology. Since it is understood as ultimately grounded in categories of action, the gulf between the mental and the real, outside, physical world is bridged. As categories of action, they must be mental things as much as they are characteristics of reality. For it is through actions that the mind and reality connect.” (1995, pg. 20)
As Hoppe points out, Mises’ view of Praxeology cuts through the mind-body problem by bringing the mind and the world together in one integrated process: human action. Ethics, as a subset of action, possesses these properties as well. Ethics is not objective or subjective, but a process that involves both in the mind and the outside world. The ends we pursue are a product of our own subjective will, but the achievement of those ends is a product of the world around us. Looking at ethics as being objective or subjective is missing the forest for the trees. It is a mechanism that contains both, and it cannot be understood without appreciating both parts.
This formation begs the question: why hasn’t anyone recognized this fact before? As discussed above, the vast majority of philosophers categorize their ethical views as either objective or subjective, with only a scant few who defy these categories. But if the truth of the objectivity/subjectivity question lies in the common sense qualities of action, why isn’t a more popular view? Unfortunately, few people understand the Praxeological structure of action. This has led philosophers into error and fallacy about the nature of ethical statements and how to understand them. These erroneous understandings have led to two different camps — the objectivists and subjectivists — both groping towards the truth but without the intellectual framework to find it.
What implications does this dual objective/subjective nature have for how we think about ethics?
I believe it is best to view ethics as subjectively emergent, but objectively constrained. Ethics only exists because there are actors who subjectively desire certain ends. If it were not for this basic teleological fact, ethics wouldn’t exist at all. But the achievement of these desires is limited by the reality that we pursue them in. We can’t just decide for ourselves the best means for attaining our ends — that is decided for us by the circumstances of our world.
If you would like to read more about a Praxeological system of ethics, read my book! In it, I discuss the Praxeological nature of ethical statements, the grounding of moral principles, and foundation for law. Even if you don’t agree with my conclusions, I can guarantee you will find them interesting. Link below:
You can also find a free PDF copy of it on the Austrian Economics Discord Server as well. Link to join:
https://discord.gg/the-austrian-economics-discord-server-tm-463155981820493824
