Ludwig von Mises was among the last of an old-breed: an Enlightenment polymath who wrote on a variety of topics. Even though Mises’ specialty was Economics, his books are scattered with digressions on other topics. These include history (which he also wrote a book on), philosophy, politics, current events, and more. But among these secondary interests, it is his writing on ethics that has prompted the most controversy.
Surprisingly, even those who ardently follow Mises in his economic views have disagreed with his ethical views. Famously, Murray Rothbard diverged from Mises on this point, along with many of Rothbard’s other students (such as Hans Hermann-Hoppe). What parts of Mises’s beliefs did they disagree with? It’s difficult to say for certain, as Mises never systematically wrote about ethics. His musings on the subject are scattered throughout his books. As such, even gathering together a full picture of Mises’s views is difficult.
My aim is to provide clarity to this situation. First, I will systematically examine Mises’s ethical views from his various writings on the subject. Secondly, I will recount the charges leveled against Mises by Rothbard and other critics. Lastly, I will see if there is any way Mises might have answered those changes, or if they could be answered for him.
Mises’s Ethical Views
First and foremost, Mises is a staunch Utilitarian. Of all his ethical views, this is the one he argues the most strongly and vigorously. Across his works, he makes positive references to Utilitarianism and Utilitarian philosophy:
“Utilitarianism finally completed the intellectual evolution inaugurated by the Greek Sophists” (Theory and History, pg 49)
“The ideology of individualism and utilitarianism which inaugurated modern capitalism brought freedom also to the religious longings of man. It shattered the pretension of those in power to impose their own creed upon their subjects.” (Theory and History, page. 340)
Mises was strongly influenced by Utilitarian thinkers, most clearly Jeremy Bentham. Mises adopted Bentham’s views on the drive behind human behavior (pleasure and pain), as well as Bentham’s term of “uneasiness” the motive to action. In contrast, Mises doesn’t look kindly upon other ethical paradigms, particularly natural law:
“Yet all these deficiencies and contradictions of the doctrine of natural law must not prevent us from recognizing its sound nucleus. Hidden in a heap of illusions and quite arbitrary prepossessions was the idea that every valid law of a country was open to critical examination by reason.” (Theory and History, pg. 48–49)
“Carried to its ultimate logical consequences, the idea of natural law led eventually to rationalism and utilitarianism” (Theory and History, pg. 45)
“All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends. The moral code has no reference to human wellbeing and happiness, to expediency, and to the mundane striving after ends. It is heteronomous, i.e., enjoined upon man by an agency that does not depend on human ideas and does not bother about human concerns.” (Theory and History, pg. 82)
Mises sees Utilitarianism as a modern system of ethics — one that supports and upholds capitalism. In contrast, natural law and other systems are irrational at best, and superstitious at worst.
Additionally, Mises uses language of action to talk about ethical propositions. This is particularly clear concerning the ultimate ends of man’s action:
“In the strict sense of the term, acting man aims only at one ultimate end, at the attainment of a state of affairs that suits him better than the alternatives. Philosophers and economists describe this undeniable fact by declaring that man prefers what makes him happier to what makes him less happy, that he aims at happiness. Happiness — in the purely formal sense in which ethical theory applies the term — is the only ultimate end, and all other things and states of affairs
sought are merely means to the realization of the supreme ultimate end. It is customary, however, to employ a less precise mode of expression, frequently assigning the name of ultimate ends to all those means that are fit to produce satisfaction directly and immediately.” (Theory and History, pg. 12–13)
Mises sees all action as being aimed towards one ultimate end — the satisfaction of uneasiness. However, he also uses the colloquial term “ultimate ends” to describe things that bring immediate happiness to people. In other words, they are done for their own sake rather than serving as means to another end. Interestingly, Mises implicitly accepts that ethics can be viewed through an action-based framework. But he never explicitly states or argues that this is true. I believe this point is an important piece of understanding Mises’s attitude towards ethics in his works, and we will return to this topic later.
Most importantly, Mises continues in the Austrian school tradition of holding value as a subjective element of human nature:
“Value is the importance that acting man attaches to ultimate ends. Only to ultimate ends is primary and original value assigned. Means are valued derivatively according to their serviceableness in contributing to the attainment of ultimate ends. Their valuation is derived from the valuation of the respective ends. They are important for man only as far as they make it possible for him to attain some ends. Value is not intrinsic, it is not in things. It is within us; it is the way in which man reacts to the conditions of his environment.” (Human Action, pg. 96)
Crucially, Mises doesn’t think that judgements of value are open to question or scrutiny. If someone says that they value something, we can’t say that they are wrong in valuing it:
Propositions asserting existence … or nonexistence … are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. … Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth or falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence. … What the theorem of the subjectivity of valuation means is that there is no standard available which would enable us to reject any ultimate judgment of value as wrong, false, or erroneous …. (Theory and History, pg. 19)
In Mises’s view, claims about valuation are not descriptive. As such, they are not truth-claims about the world. Mises clarifies his views elsewhere, speaking more on the relationship between means and ends:
“Means are judged and appreciated according to their ability to produce definite effects. While judgments of value are personal, subjective, and final, judgments about means are essentially inferences drawn from factual propositions concerning the power of the means in question to produce definite effects. About the power of a means to produce a definite effect there can be dissension and dispute between men. For the evaluation of ultimate ends there is no interpersonal standard available.” (Theory and History, pg. 14)
But if value judgments cannot be right or wrong — or in other words, people can be wrong about means but not ends — how can Mises advocate for laissez-faire capitalism? If other people don’t want free markets, how can Mises say they are wrong? Mises resolves this tension through the productivity of capitalism. Because capitalism is the best means for attaining the end of material prosperity, it is the best means for almost everyone to pursue:
“The essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy as applied to the problems of society can be restated as follows: Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man’s reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends.” (Theory and History, pg. 55–56)
“Every step by which an individual substitutes concerted action for isolated action results in an immediate and recognizable improvement in his conditions. The advantages derived from peaceful cooperation and division of labor are universal. They immediately benefit every generation, and not only Iater descendants. For what the individual must sacrifice for the sake of society he is amply compensated by greater advantages. His sacrifice is only apparent and temporary; he foregoes a smaller gain in order to reap a greater one later.” (Human Action, pg. 146)
Because of the benefits of free markets, it is in the interest of nearly everyone to advocate for capitalism. If anyone prefers a different system (socialism, interventionism, protectionism, etc.), then they are wrong about the correct means to attain their end. In essence, Mises believes that everyone has the same ultimate end of prosperity, but some people are just mistaken about how to achieve that end.
Criticisms of Mises’s Views
As mentioned above, Mises’s views on ethics have received no small amount of scrutiny. Mises’s student Murray Rothbard raised two points of contention with his Utilitarian outlook:
- Rothbard believed that Utilitarianism is insufficient for defending a free society
- Mises has adopted an ethical subjectivism, and therefore, is in no position to say what is right and wrong
Rothbard’s first critique is a question on utilitarianism more broadly, but the second critique is far more piercing to Mises and his ideology. In his article “On Mises’s Ethical Relativism”, Rothbard writes:
“Moreover, not only can we say with absolute assurance that certain methods and means are irrational, but can also go on to say that certain ends are irrational. Suppose that A’s end is to torture B, because A enjoys it. Even if it lies within A’s power to do so, and even if A need not fear retaliation by the police or by B or B’s friends, I think it can be demonstrated that such torture and love of torture is contrary to the nature of man and to what is required by that nature for man’s true happiness; I think it can be demonstrated that such perversions of man’s nature are profoundly irrational. Yet Mises would insist on adding “from my personal point of view.” It is not just my or your subjective “point of view” that decrees this; it is our objective, absolute insight into the discoverable nature of man.
What has happened here, and elsewhere, is that Mises has strayed off his great stomping ground, praxeology, on to a field, ethics, where he is, I believe, tragically wrong. For irrationality or rationality of ends involve an ethical judgment, and Mises’s subjectivity that we have just noted means simply this: that Mises, while a praxeological or epistemological absolutist, is, unfortunately, an ethical relativist. To Mises, there is no such a thing as absolute ethics; man, by the use of his mind, cannot discover a true, “scientific” ethics by insight into what is best for man’s nature. Ultimate ends, values, ethics, are simply subjective, personal, and purely arbitrary. If they are arbitrary, Mises never explains where they come from: how any individual arrives at them. I can’t see how he could arrive at any answer except the subjective, relative emotions of each individual.”
Roderick Long has repeated a similar criticism of Mises’s views. In his unpublished book “Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action” (AKA “Wiggy Draft”), he writes:
“In short, Mises apparently thinks that economic subjectivism entails ethical subjectivism. From the fact that in explaining an agent’s behavior we cannot legitimately appeal to any values other than her own, Mises draws the conclusion that ultimate values themselves cannot be assessed for correctness or incorrectness. Statements of fact are testable; statements of value are not…Other Austrians have not followed Mises here; Hayek and Rothbard, for example, have each defended (quite dissimilar) non-subjectivist ethical theories, while Hoppe, far from regarding praxeology as an impediment to ethical objectivism, has developed a discourse ethic (in the tradition of Apel and Habermas) grounded in praxeology itself. Mises’ admirers are right not to follow him here, for the same anti-psychologistic considerations that inform Mises’ project in the first place actually militate against Mises’ understanding of the status of value judgments.” (pg. 149–150)
A Misesean Defense
Was Mises really an ethical subjectivist? If he was, how could he reconcile this with his stalwart promotion of free markets and classical liberalism? Even if capitalism is the best means for attaining material prosperity — as Mises claimed — surely this still leaves room for doubt. After all, if “good” and “bad” are subjective categories, then how can Mises really be sure that capitalism is “good” for everyone? At the very least, wouldn’t he express more caution around that claim?
First and foremost, we can’t know the mind of Mises. Unfortunately, he is no longer with us, so we don’t have the privilege of asking him. All we can do is examine what he has written. Judging by Mises’s statements about valuations and normative statements, he does seem to be supporting some type of ethical subjectivism. If people can’t be wrong about the ultimate ends they pursue, then the goodness of those ends is subjective. As Long claims, it seems Mises believes that economic subjectivism entails ethical subjectivism.
However, the answer is not so clear-cut. As I emphasized at the outset, Mises never wrote systematically on ethics. Where he did write on ethics in his books, these discussions are always for the sake of making a broader point, whether it be economic methodology, the value-free nature of economics, etc. This is why his writings on the topic are so fragmentary. We should at least be open to the idea that Mises held other views on ethics that he never made explicit in his writings. One example of these latent views is Mises’s aforementioned usage of Praxeological language in ethics. He seems to support the idea of Praxeological language in ethics, but never elaborates on this idea.
Again, we cannot know for sure what Mises thought. However, from what I can surmise, it seems like Mises had thoughts on ethics that he didn’t write about. Was Mises really an ethical subjectivist? Perhaps, but I believe it equally possible that Mises held a more nuanced position than he portrays in his books. Unfortunately, he never elaborated on such a position, so we cannot know for certain the extent of his beliefs.
If Mises did have a more developed view of ethics, what would these views look like? One place we can look is Henry Hazlitt’s work on ethics, “Foundations of Morality”. Hazlitt was a student of Mises, and his influence is palpable throughout the book. Hazlitt is a Utilitarian, a classical liberal in favor of free market capitalism, and emphasizes the importance of social cooperation — all positions held by Mises as well. Hazlitt cites Mises favorably throughout the book, and thanks Mises in the foreword for reading the manuscript and offering his own suggestions for changes. Given the intellectual similarities between the two men and the complementary nature of Hazlitt’s work to Mises, we can assume that Mises agreed with at least some (but probably most) of “Foundations of Morality”.
But what about the specific charge of subjectivism? Even if Mises had more developed ethical positions, is there any way for him to escape being branded as a subjectivist? As I discuss in Chapter V of my book, Praxeological Ethics, I believe he can. As Mises himself supports, ethical statements can be interpreted as statements of action. Is action something that is objective or subjective? This question is much harder to answer than it might seem. On one hand, action has objective qualities: it takes place in the world and changes the world around us. On the other hand, action has subjective qualities as well: it is the product of a subjective uneasiness and aimed at achieving subjectively valued ends. So which is it? Is action objective or subjective? The truth is that it is both, simultaneously. Because action is a process that involves both the mental and the physical, it bridges them with both objective and subjective qualities
(For a full discussion on this point, see my blog article, “Objectivism and Subjectivism: Bridging the Divide”)
Did Mises himself grasp this deeper point about the nature of ethics and action? Maybe, but again, we can’t know for sure. Regardless, Mises’s system can be defended against the charges of ethical subjectivism, even if Mises himself wasn’t cognizant of this fact. Adopting a Praxeological system of ethics doesn’t resign one to ethical subjectivism, but instead, opens up a new and unique way of looking at ethics.
It is regrettable that Mises never fully laid out his views on ethics. Even so, his scattered approach to the topic is understandable. After he was forced to flee Europe to escape the Nazis, Mises fell into relative obscurity. The people who did know him viewed him as an anachronism — a forgotten product of a bygone age. His works on economics received little attention (he was barely able to publish his magnum opus, Human Action), so it is doubtful that a book on ethics would have received any more attention. Thankfully, however, Mises has seen a resurgence of interest ever since his death, leading more and more people to learn from the “Grand Old Man of Economics”.
If you are interested in reading more about ethics and action, I recommend you read my book, Praxeological Ethics. In it, I discuss the Praxeological nature of ethical statements, the grounding of moral principles, and foundation for law. Even if you don’t agree with my conclusions, I can guarantee you will find them interesting. Link below:
You can also find a free PDF copy of it on the Austrian Economics Discord Server as well. Link to join:
https://discord.gg/the-austrian-economics-discord-server-tm-463155981820493824
