In Chapter III of Praxeological Ethics, I discussed the famous Is/Ought problem of moral philosophy, reaching the conclusion that there is no categorical difference between positive and normative statements. The reason philosophers have maintained this erroneous distinction is their ignorance of Praxeology. While the distinction between positive and normative is still useful, the difference is one of degree and not of kind.
However, there is a specific aspect of this topic I wish to dissect in length: why are positive and normative statements different at all? Even if the differences between them are minimal, there is still a difference. What is the root cause of this difference? In order to fully capture the essence of positivity and normativity, we first have to understand the category of teleology.
The human experience is filled with fundamental, irreducible categories — concepts that cannot be understood unless you already understand them. For instance, you cannot describe the color blue to someone who has never seen a color before. They have no frame of reference. They can’t contextualize understanding your descriptions, and thus, they can’t understand them. Similarly, you can’t describe the taste of bread to someone who has never tasted anything before. This irreducibility is found in many other concepts we implicitly rely upon: space, time, entities, etc. Unless you can already comprehend these concepts, you can’t learn them.
The reason we can understand these categories is due to the innate faculties of the human mind. They are a priori, to use a philosophical term. We don’t need to learn about time or space because we are born with an inherent understanding of these concepts (or, at the least, we are born with a nascent understanding that develops naturally over time).
One of these categories (although it is not often recognized as such) is the category of teleology. This category is the fundamental sense of desire or wanting. To place it in Praxeological terms, it is the faculty of having sought-after ends. We don’t just observe the world and live within it, but desire for it to be changed in particular ways. Not everything has this category of teleology. Rocks, dirt, water, etc. are part of this world, but they don’t have any goals. Animals express a limited degree of teleological desire, but they don’t consciously pursue ends. They are driven by instinct, not reason.
(For an in-depth discussion on teleology, I recommend my blog article, “Understanding Teleology”)
What does this mean for positive and normative statements? To briefly restate my arguments in Praxeological Ethics, normative statements are statements about action — specifically, the suitability of a means for attaining an end. Statements of action are just as much about things in the world as positive statements, thereby showing that there is no categorical difference between the two. However, we can amend this position through an understanding of teleology and its importance in action.
As I demonstrate in Chapter III, we commonly use statements with hidden assumptions. Our fundamental categories serve as assumptions as well. For instance, if I tell someone “I will meet you in a half-hour”, I am implicitly assuming they understand the concept of time. It is here, in the underlying assumptions, that we find the core difference between positive and normative statements: normative statements are implying teleology, whereas positive statements are not.
This explains the supposed gap between “Is” statements and “Ought” statements. In order to cross from an “Is” to an “Ought”, you have to introduce a teleological component. Without teleology, you can’t make statements about desires or wants, and therefore, about what is good or bad. In order to “enable” these types of statements, you have to bring teleology into the picture. This introduction isn’t a violation or a transformation of a positive statement, but the addition of an implicit concept that wasn’t in previous statements.
Normative statements have a categorical assumption that positive statements do not. The much-vaunted chasm between “Is” and “Ought” reduces to this teleological element. Even so, it is still a pragmatically useful distinction. Being able to refer to moral versus non-moral statements is important, even if the difference between the two is less severe than popularly believed.
If you are interested in reading more about ethics, I recommend you read my book! In it, I discuss the Praxeological nature of ethical statements, the grounding of moral principles, and foundation for law. Even if you don’t agree with my conclusions, I can guarantee you will find them interesting. Link below:
You can also find a free PDF copy of it on the Austrian Economics Discord Server as well. Link to join:
https://discord.gg/the-austrian-economics-discord-server-tm-463155981820493824
